for an impossible figment of an observer's imagination, something utterly non-existent. Perhaps adoption was not common within Tibetan culture; it is a part of ours. In the historical study of religions, nothing is quite so common as a barren woman's son: a fact or category appropriated and nurtured in a new discursive home. Within the study of Buddhism, one such child is the Mahayana/ Hinayana distinction. Introductory courses and textbooks have long adopted this pair of native Indian terms for their presentation of Buddhism. If students retain one fact from introductory courses on Indian Buddhism, it is probably this distinction. And even at more advanced stages of scholarship, Hlnaycna and Mahaydna remain valued concepts, like elder children who keep the younger in line. This paper is one case-worker's study of the treatment these terms have received within our discursive household. Taking my evidence from Indian Buddhist polemical literature, sutra literature, and epigraphs, I will explore how scholars have adopted a view of Buddhism's past that realizes, naturalizes, and historicizes the analytic functionality of the Mahayana/Hinayana distinction. I will conclude that Buddhism so-constituted is a changeling, unrealistic, unnatural, unhistorical. Yet, let me emphasize from the
century Mahdydnasutrdlamkdra, a formative classic of Mahayana doctrine: "the Sravakayana [i.e., Hinayana] and Mahayana are mutually opposed."2 For Asanga this fundamental incommensurability is ideological and practical in nature: the two ydnas diverge in their aspirations, teachings, practices, supports,3 and times.4 Asanga's brief analysis ends with the assessment that "as a result of [the two ycnas'] mutual opposition, the Hinayana is truly inferior; it is not capable of becoming the Mahayana."5 Asanga's polemic is seductive, suggesting that the distinction between Great and Little Vehicles is thoroughgoing, and thus that a comprehensive set of criteria can be formulated through which to distinguish them. Indeed, the indices of differentiation Asanga cites-aspirations, teachings, etc.-are precisely those that modern analyses of Buddhism use for reconstructing Buddhism's history along ydnic lines. Nevertheless, although Mahayana polemic literature fosters the treatment of Mahayana and Hinayana as ideal types, the historian's task is "to complicate not to clarify," in J. Z. Smith's phrase (290). And one does find historical studies of the Mahayana's origins, genealogy, and progressive development that reveal a range of institutional and doctrinal (dis)continuities between the two ydnas. Studies of this sort problematize the stark characterizations of the yanas found in native Mahayanist literature, but they often do not address that rhetoric's essential bifurcation of Indian Buddhism. The following passage from Andrew Rawlinson demonstrates this point:
We are asking the wrong question if we try and find an origin of the Mahayana. . . . We will not find it among the laity or the Mahasamghikas or among rebel monks or breakaway Abhidharmists or among the invading tribes of northwest India. All of these made a contribution, but the contribution of each was controlled by the multi-dimensional model of the Mahayana that existed from the beginning (170). 3According to Mahayana doctrine, spiritual transformation takes place over a more or less prolonged span, during which an adherent accumulates spiritual merit (punya) and develops spiritual insight (jidna). These two are envisioned as "supports." 4See the previous note. Because the Mahayana purports to require more and greater "supports," the period of time necessary for the realization of its highest goal also surpasses that of the Sravakayana. 5tasmdd anyonyavirodhdd yad ydnam h(nam hfnam eva tat na tan mahdyanam bhavitum arhati (Shastri:4). I wholly agree with Rawlinson's presentation of Mahayana's origin as "multi-dimensional." But what is one to make of the turn Rawlinson takes at the end of his statement, whereby he abstracts the Mahayana/Hinayana distinction from the realm of history and reconstitutes it in terms of an original model "that existed from the beginning."6 The present paper is concerned in large part to argue against such attempts to "save appearances," an expression that derives from efforts to maintain the Ptolemaic cosmos in the face of mounting contradictory evidence. On the one hand, the division of Indian Buddhism into two mutually exclusive "species" compels analytic precision; on the other hand, the complex history of those ydnas' interactions belies that design.
Scholarship on Indian Buddhism is caught in the uneasy grip of these two hands. One particularly interesting case to review in this regard is the treatment of a little-known Mahayana sutra, the Ajitasenavyakarananirdesa Sutra (Aj). Known only from a single sixth century manuscript discovered at Gilgit, this text's colophon calls it a "Mahayana sutra" (Dutt 1984:169 ). Yet, despite this explicit identification of the Aj with the Mahayana on the part of its sixth-century scribe, the text's modern editor, Nalinaksha Dutt, feels it "represents the semi-Mahayanic form of Buddhism" containing "an admixture of both the Hinayanic and Mahayanic ideals" The point these two scholars miss, of course, is that however early in the Mahayana's development one sets the date of the Aj's 6See Foucault's classic essay "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" for a statement on the disparity between the project of producing a multi-leveled genealogy and that of recovering an essence at the origin. first composition, the manuscript's colophon tells us that as late as the sixth century two lay Buddhists, Balosimha and his wife Jijadi, chose to have this sutra copied, perhaps at the behest of their spiritual benefactor Sthirabandhu (Hinuber:63). The manuscripts discovered at Gilgit, of which the Aj is one, are the only cache of Buddhist manuscripts that have survived intact from ancient India, our single window onto the precise texts that held interest for an identifiable local Buddhist community. If in the first century the Aj was a text characteristic of "Mahayana before 'Mahayana'" (Williams:26), in the sixth century it was simply another Mahayana sutra to be copied and worshipped.
Be this as it may, Dutt's and Williams's discomfort with a sixthcentury scribe's designation of the Aj a "Mahayana sitra" illustrates one difficulty scholarship on Indian Buddhism has faced in its treatment of the Mahayana/Hinayana distinction. Both scholars expect that a single characteristic, or set of characteristics, prima facie distinguishes the Mahayana. This may be why they discuss the Aj's institutional affiliation and doctrinal content in terms of the religious milieu at the unknown moment of its original composition rather than that of its known reproduction in Gilgit. As a text from the Mahayana's earliest stratum, the Aj's "inconsistencies" are interpretable as indices of transition within the accepted ydnic framework. As a sixth-century expression of the Mahayana, the Aj makes no sense.
Moreover, although Dutt and Williams agree that the Aj is a Mahayana sitra, almost, they differ as to why this is so. The Aj invokes many characteristically Mahayanist doctrines and myths but does not actively place these elements in contradistinction to a Hinayana. Accordingly, Williams aligns the text with the Mahayana as a body of doctrine but not as an institution. Indeed, for Williams, the term "Mahayana" is meaningful only insofar as Mahayanists define themselves within an institutional dyad, in contradistinction to the Hinayana. For Dutt, by contrast, the text represents a "semi-Mahayanic" form of Buddhism because it "incorporates the Mahayanic ideals without, however, [the Mahayana's] philosophy of Dharmauinyata"7 (1984:74); here doctrine supersedes institution as a criterion for separating the yanas. For me, the fundamental tensions occasioned by the lack of consensus regarding how to distinguish the ydnas became clear while researching a dissertation on the beliefs and practices of the local Buddhist community associated with the Ajanta caves between 462 and 480 C.E.8 Attempting to relate evidence at the site to Buddhism's native categories, I was struck first by my expectation that Ajanta's fifth-century community belonged exclusively to one of the two ydnas, and second by my inability to establish which ycna it was. This was all the more frustrating because most literature on Ajanta recapitulates an art-historical commonplace that periodizes the over one thousand Buddhist caves scattered across western India into two neat phases. There is the Hinayana phase, stretching from approximately the second century B.C.E. until the third C.E., followed by the Mahayana, commencing in the fifth century after a two-hundred year hiatus. I went to Ajanta expecting that art historian Sheila Weiner was correct when she wrote, "Ajanta occupies a unique position in the history of Indian art because it is the only extant site of such grandeur which ... extends in time from the early Hfnaydna aniconic phase through the Mahayana period.... It is in itself a kind of document which traces visually the development of Buddhist thought and evolution" (2-3). But after living at the site for nearly one year I was not so certain. Two separate points may be questioned in Weiner's remarks and the conventional use of the ydnas for the study of western Indian Buddhist caves. First, one may wonder whether all fifth-century cave monasteries are Mahayanist? Perhaps Ajanta was a Hinayanist site in the fifth century. Second, one may wonder whether the ydnas are a useful or meaningful set of categories through which to describe and discuss these caves. Although I am interested ultimately in the latter point, towards that end I will take as a springboard the observations of two scholars who made the former, i.e., who rejected the common identification of Ajanta as a Mahayanist site in the fifth century, proposing instead that it was Hinayanist.
In order for the non-specialist to understand those scholars' arguments for why Ajanta was Hinayanist, I must first review a crucial assumption about Buddhism's institutional history, one widely accepted within the field. To wit, several centuries after Sakyamuni's nirvana the sangha split into numerous fraternities based upon diverging teachers' lineages as well as disputes over doctrine and monastic practice. Native doxographers have traditionally numbered these sects (Sanskrit, nikayas) as eighteen;9 and Indian 9The number eighteen is the traditional count of Buddhist sects. A browse through any text on the subject, however, will quickly reveal that there were more than eighteen schools in total. For a summary of the fundamental Indian literature on the sects see Lamotte Buddhist literature and epigraphs make reference to "the monks of the eighteen nikdyas" as a metonymy for the sangha as a whole. The important point here is that modern scholars corporately equate the eighteen nikdyas with the Hinayana and, more significantly yet, represent these nikdyas as a corporate group in contradistinction to the Mahayana. Such an understanding is witnessed, for example, in a recent monograph by Jan Nattier. Her index includes the entry "Nikaya Buddhism (the 'eighteen schools')" (314)-a terminology Nattier equates with, but prefers to, "Hinayana" (9, n. 1)-and she explicitly sets Nikaya and Mahayana Buddhisms in opposition on several occasions ( Bechert's precis assumes the well-rehearsed account of Buddhism's institutional development: a linear branching of monastic assem-(1988:517-548), which includes a bibliography of the principal secondary work on the Buddhist sects to his date. The terms 'sect' and 'school' are both found variously in the scholarly literature on Buddhism. As 'school' generally connotes a group formed around a particular doctrine or teacher, while 'sect' carries no such definite implications, and as there were a multiplicity of reasons for the sects' divergence, I have used the latter term. 10The question of what to call non-Mahayana Buddhism has long vexed Western scholars. The term Hfnaydna is the most common but is also the most problematic. Hfna has qualitative as well as quantitative implications: it can be translated as "debased," "inferior," or "mean" in addition to the more common "smaller" or "lesser," and thus is offensive to many Buddhists. Alternatives such as "Theravada" (which is just plain wrong), "sectarian (i.e., nikdya) Buddhism," "early Buddhism," and even "non-Mahayana Buddhism" have been used. At the moment, "nikdya Buddhism" seems to be scholars' alternative of choice for Hfnayana, bolstering my argument that this equation has become a given within the study of Indian Buddhism. Though I am sensitive to the pejorative significance of Hfnaydna, I contend that "nikdya Buddhism" is not the most historically accurate substitute. blies due to disputes over cenobitic rule and doctrine resulted in the eighteen Hinayana nikdyas; the Mahayana, by contrast, had a diffuse origin, in which monks, nuns, and lay-persons drawn from many communities, with their multiplicity of doctrines, practices, and texts, were united around a common religious aspiration: to become Buddhas themselves for the benefit of all living beings.
Based upon To understand the fuller ramifications of these two epigraphic pericopes, we may look to the work of Gregory Schopen, who has attempted to document the Mahayana's emergence as a self-conscious institutional presence in India, defining and declaring itself publicly as a distinct entity through the unique epithets and formulae by which its members identified themselves epigraphically. Schopen's historical conclusions are not our concern at present. Instead, his analysis is salient, for it attempts to prove that epigraphs can be associated with the Mahayana even if they do not use this term explicitly. More important yet, the two indices whose presence marks an epigraph as Mahayanist are precisely the two aforementioned elements found in Cave 22. First, according to Schopen, "The term sakyabhiksu... must be a title used to designate a member of the Mahayana community who was also a member of a monastic community" (1979:11). Second, Schopen's study of Buddhist epigraphs has determined that the formula used in this inscription for dedicating spiritual merit is "virtually the exclusive property of the Mahayana" (12). In view of Schopen's broad study of Buddhist inscriptions, the Cave 22 inscription cannot confirm Leese's proposition about Ajanta's ydnic affiliation but may suggest, rather, that the site was Mahayanist. Indeed, out of Ajanta's fifty-nine donative inscriptions dated to the fifth century, twentythree use the epithet sakyabhiksu, and about fourteen use a varia17There seems to be no specific mention of merit here because the record is so damaged. However, the portion that remains and size of the lacuna leave little doubt that this inscription used a dedicatory formula that became popular in the fifth century and continued in use until Buddhism's final demise in India. Although there exist many minor variations on this formula, quite typically it reads: Whatever merit there is in this [donation] 
TOWARDS A TAXONOMY OF THE YANAS
Here is the central question my reconstruction of Cave 22's inscription raises: Can a self-described member of a nikcya accept the bodhisattva vow and still be categorized as a Hinayanist? Clearly, the answer has less to do with Buddhist history than with the scholarly conventions we adopt. This is a matter of definition, of "low order meaning" in Roy Rappaport's phrase (127). It is a matter of fixing distinctions within a hierarchy of meanings. In short, it is a question of taxonomy. How do we, should we, construct a taxonomic model of Buddhist institutions?
To understand what is stake in this question, let us review how taxonomies work. (The following discussion is indebted to Frederick Suppe's The Semantic Conception of Theories.) Taxonomy is a means for organizing information whereby units of information, taxa, are clearly distinguished one from the other, enabling the coherent grouping of individuals with shared attributes. Differentiation occurs in terms of characteristics-morphological, phylogenetic, functional, social, etc.-resulting in a system of taxonomic categories capable of being emplotted on two axes, horizontally as well as vertically. The Linnaean system is the most familiar, allowing a quick reminder of how these two axes relate. Using Indian society as an example, we may abstract the religious from the political from the economic realm, for example, and call these "families." Buddhism would then be one "genus" of Indian religion, and Hinaydna Buddhism one "species." According to this classic taxonomic model, a nikdya, a sub-species of the species Hinayana Buddhism cannot belong to another species, e.g., Mahdyana Buddhism. The taxonomic architecture prohibits this vertically (recall Bechert from above: "Mahayana itself is not to be conceived as a 'sect' ") as well as horizontally ("the nikayas come into being inside the development of Hinayana"). Nevertheless, in terms of the particulars of religious life-practices, monastic rule, and so on-the Mahayana may be continuous with one nikdya or another in many details. Mahayanists might come from all nikdyas; yet there is an expectation that prior nikdya affiliations are moot once a ydnic conversion is made. Or, more generally put, any given taxon is characterized by the similarity of the members of its class, which are absolutely differentiated from members of other taxa within the taxonomy's universe contingent upon the level of abstraction within the categorical hierarchy. Accordingly, a clear understanding of the relationship between the Mahayana and Hinayana will depend upon the precision with which one maintains awareness of the relationships and logical levels between the contrasted entities. Although overlaps between an individual nikdya and the Mahayana may occur in selected individual characteristics, analytically the two remain absolutely separate. Now, in the broadest terms, taxonomies come in two flavors, "natural" and "artificial." Taxa definitions in natural taxonomies are considered to have a natural basis in reality; they "are factually true or false assertions about the characteristics distinctive of [their] members" (Suppe:248). In artificial taxonomies, categories are defined according to arbitrary and functional conventions. Accordingly, when we seek to classify these two "species" of Buddhism, we must first decide whether we want this classificatory system to conform to, and describe, historical actualities on their own terms, reconstructed through available evidence; or whether it should be treated as a conventional construction, stipulatively defined so as to yield a useful analysis of whatever specific material is at hand. There is no reason to believe that scholars of Buddhism have heretofore sought anything but a natural, historical understanding of the ydnas.
For a taxonomy to be natural, the taxa must be defined so that there is "a single intrinsic property characteristic of all and only those individuals belonging to a given taxon" (Suppe:217). To make "Mahayana" and "Hinayana" work as natural taxa we need but a single intrinsic property characteristic of all members of the Mahayana and another characteristic of all Hinayanists. In this study, I have claimed that Western scholars commonly satisfy these minimum requirements by presenting the Mahayana's essential property as its members' acceptance of a universalized bodhisattva ideal and the Hinayana's as its members' identification with a specific nikdya. Membership in the Mahayana is diagnosed primarily by an ideological position; membership in the Hinayana by an institutional affiliation. Yet, according to my reading of the Cave 22 inscription, we have a self-identified member of the Aparasaila nikaya committing himself to the quintessential Mahayanist aspiration. In view of this inscription, how do we maintain a strict analytic separation between taxa, such that every individual fits into only a single taxon? Do we choose (1) the nominal separation between the nikdyas and the Mahayana as our criterion for categorizing the yanic affiliation of the Cave 22 donor? Or (2) do we choose as criteria the tenets and practices this donor accepts within his epigraph?
Selection of the former possibility leads to an identification of this donor with the Hinayana; select the latter and he is a Mahayanist. In natural taxonomies "the definitional form for given taxa in a domain is a question of empirical fact" (Suppe:248). Accordingly, if we choose the first alternative, "Mahayana" and "Hinayana" are meaningful as naturally defined taxa insofar as they are defined through data that explicitly communicates a nikaya or ydna affiliation. Such a taxonomy could not support generalizations about the yanic substrate of Buddhist ideologies and practices: the identification of the bodhisattvaydna with the Mahayana, so prevalent in scholarship on Buddhism, would have to be relinquished. Selection of the second alternative leads to the conclusion that an individual's membership in one of the nikdyas cannot be treated as having a predictive value for his ydnic affiliation. This, in turn, means that the prevailing conception of the nikdyas as sub-species of the Hinayana should be aborted. Here the Mahayana/Hinayana distinction can be preserved on the level of doctrine and practice but loses most of its significance as a handle for Indian Buddhist institutional history.
Can a member of a nikdya vow to lead all beings to Buddhahood and still be categorized as a Hinayanist? If one assents to this proposition, then one treats Hinayana/Mahayana as a pair of institutional taxa whose members are best determined through sociological and demographic studies. If one denies the assertion, then the ydnas retain their value as categories for Buddhist ideology, and the nomological and doxographical literatures of Buddhism remain principle sources for their definition. The trade-off is that these taxa will lose value as institutional indices, except where direct, explicit evidence for an individual's yanic affiliation is preserved. However, since we possess no evidence for a Buddhist affirming his inclusion within the "Hinayana" akin to Asanga's professions vis-a-vis the Mahayana, we are left with a history of Indian Buddhism that includes a few self-declared Mahayanists, a few members of various nikayas-albeit of unknown ydnic affiliationand no Hinayanists at all. Mahayana/Hinayana becomes an odd distinction indeed. :279-285) . The only secondary work known to me on this topic is that of CONCLUSION I introduced this paper with a set of questions regarding the functional value of the Mahayana/Hinayana distinction. To be sure, these taxa make our lives simpler when talking or writing about Buddhism in India. But (to paraphrase Geertz) they formulate a conceptual ordering of Buddhism and clothe this conception with such an aura of factuality that it seems uniquely realistic. They are icons, in both senses, Piercean and devotional. Of all the categories through which to reconstruct Indian Buddhism's history, Mahayana and Hinayana are the most productive. Nevertheless, our reconstructions have a secret life of their own. Each ydna can be defined positively, through a necessary and sufficient characteristic for individuals' membership within that taxon. Moreover, because these two yanas are logical opposites, each can also be defined negatively, through its lack of the other's necessary and sufficient characteristic. However, in both cases, these positive and negative definitions are not conceptually equivalent. That is, the Mahayana is positively characterized by its members' pursuit of the bodhisattva path; the Hinayana is negatively characterized as the non-Mahayana, i.e., its members do not necessarily pursue Buddhahood as their ideal. However, when positively characterized, the Hinayana is defined by members' affiliation with one or another nikaya, which, of course, means that the Mahayana is known negatively by its members' institutional separation from those same nikdyas. In short, discourse on the yanas has treated an apples-and-oranges distinction as one of apples alone.
Stephen Kent. Although Kent's overarching argument is interesting, his use of Buddhist sources is highly problematic and one must check every citation before accepting its validity. Both the Lotus and Kent's sources come from early strata of Mahayana literature. Yet this topos was not discarded as the Mahayana developed. One clearly late Mahayana sutra that invokes it is the Sarvatathdgatadhisthanasatvdvalokanabuddhaksetrasamdarsanavyaha found at Gilgit (Vira and Chandra:1772.6-1773.1, 1776.4-5). In addition to its presence as a scriptural pericope, non-Mahayanist hostility to the Mahayana is recorded in contemporary accounts of Buddhism (told, of course, by Mahayana narrators). For instance, the philosopher Vasubandhu's biographer records that before Vasubandhu converted to the Mahayana, his brother accused him of not believing in the Mahayana and constantly attacking and discrediting it (Takakusu:291). Similarly within Hsiian Tsang's Si Yu Ki we learn of a fifthcentury Sarvastivadin monk named Vimalamitra who vowed to "cause the learned men of Jambudvipa [i.e., India] to forget the name of the Great Vehicle and destroy the fame of Vasubandhu" . In point of fact, Jaini (133) suggests that this same Vimalamitra may have been the author of the Abhidharmadfpa, a text highly critical of Vasubandhu (see note 23).
Finally, perhaps the only single intrinsic property characteristic of everything Mahayanist is that it is not Hinayanist, and vice versa. Here we are left with the Mahayana/Hinayana distinction as a mere structural dualism devoid of specific content, a mere nominalism. This conclusion hardly yields a worthwhile definition of these taxa appropriate for historical research. Nevertheless, it is possible to construct natural, historical, and meaningful taxonomies based upon these ydnas, wherein all individuals within each taxon possess at least one element in common, and that element does not belong to members of the other yana. To realize this possibility, we must recognize that taxonomic schemes, like maps, are appropriate only to restricted domains. One can create more than one taxonomic scheme using a single set of data. Change the way taxa are defined, the model's conceptual universe, and the categorization of members may change as well. We do not labor within a Linnaean universe where individuals are defined only by the totality of their characteristics. Cave 22's donor can be a both a "Mahayanist" and a "Hinayanist," albeit not within the same taxonomic moment. Our approach to Buddhism's history in India must rely upon a hermeneutic sensitive to, and respectful of, the many divergent discursive, historical, institutional, psychological, practical, ideological, and social contexts within which we use these analytic categories. In the end, there is no Mahayana/Hinayana distinction: there are many.
